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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
than "or." 43 The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree, and he
appealed upon the basis that the erroneous wording of the statute in the charge
was prejudicial. The Court of Appeals found that the incorrect wording was a
technical, and not a prejudicial, error, and that the subject was properly covered
in other portions of the charge. The court must, after hearing the appeal, give
judgment without regard to technical errors or defects which do not effect the
44
substantial rights of the parties.
(b) An information may be sworn to before certain officers who are not
notaries public where a traffic summons has been served.43 However where it
is established that no traffic summons has been served, then this authority does
not exist. In People v. Polle,46 the defendant had been convicted of a violation
of the Vehicle and Traffic Law upon an information which was sworn to before
a sergeant of the Sheriff's Office who was not a notary public. It was testified
to that at the time no traffic summons had been issued and the defendant
immediately moved to dismiss the information. The Court of Appeals, applying
a very strict interpretation of the law, found that the dismissal should have been
granted because Section 208 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law would not apply,
and the court, therefore, had no jurisdiction.
(c) The case of Fisher v. State was an action against the State of New
York for damages suffered as a result of the tortious actions of a County
Assistant District Attorney.47 The action was brought upon a respondeat
superior theory under which the State would be held liable for the actions of
the county officer. The action was dismissed below for failure to state a cause
of action. 48 Local county officers are either elected to their posts or appointed
from the county in which they reside. They are paid by the county and although
they operate within the framework of the law of New York State, their
responsibility is to their own country. The Court of Appeals found that the
officer in the present case could not be considered a state officer within the
meaning of present New York Statutes 49 and case law.3 0
Bd.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
STATE TRENDs IN CRIMINAL DIscoVERY

While civil discovery has undergone rapid change, its criminal counterpart
has remained relatively dormant. There has been a great resistance to any
43. N.Y. Penal Law § 1120.

44. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 542.
45. N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 208.

46. 9 N.Y.2d 349, 214 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1961).
47.

10 N.Y.2d 60, 217 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1961).

48. Fisher v. State of New York, 23 Misc. 2d 935, 203 N.Y.S.2d 363 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
49. N.Y. Public Officers Law § 2.
50. Ritter v. State of New York, 283 App. Div. 833, 128 N.Y.S.2d 830 (3d Dep't
1954).
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advancement in this area. For this reason every new development takes on
great significance, and a forward looking decision sets up a hue and cry that can
be heard throughout the nation. There are many willing fingers to plug the
dike, and many fingersore people after the Supreme Court's decision in Jencks v.
United States.' The Jencks case has provided an impetus to state 2action as
may be noted from New York's recent decision in People v. Rosario.
The Jencks case overruled prior federal holdings that the judge must first
examine pretrial statements of a witness for inconsistency before they could be
obtained by defense counsel. The Supreme Court held that defendant was
entitled to examine reports without, as some previous cases had required, a
preliminary showing of inconsistency between the reports and the witness'
testimony at the trial, or a preliminary in camera inspection of the reports by
the judge to determine relevancy. A sufficient foundation for these reports was
established by the testimony of the witness that the reports were of events and
activities related in his testimony. The Court said that to require a showing
of inconsistency would be clearly incompatible with our standards for administration of criminal justice in the federal courts and must therefore be rejected.3
Only the defense is adequately equipped to determine the effective use of the
reports for purposes of discrediting the Government's witness and thereby furthering the accused's defense. The defense must initially be entitled to see4
them to determine what use may be made of them. "Justice requires no less."
The holding of the Jencks case affects only discovery at the trial.5 The prior
statement is obtainable only after a showing by counsel that the evidence
6
is relevant, competent and outside of any exclusionary rule.
Some of the federal district courts interpreted the Jencks case as a broad
statement of policy and attempted to expand the holding to include pretrial discovery. Congress was jarred by the decision, 7 and fearing further expansion
of the principle, it hastily enacted legislation to limit the scope and application
of the rule. 8 The legislation follows the basic approach of the case, inasmuch as
no prior inconsistency between statement and testimony need be laid. The
judge, by in camera inspection, determines if the statement relates to the testimony; if it does, it is admissible. 9
The legislation differs from the Jencks holding in two respects: 1. The
trial court has discretion either to strike the witness' testimony or declare a
mistrial if the Government fails to produce the requested statement. Under
the Jencks rule a governmental claim of privilege resulted in dismissal of the
1.,353 U.S. 657 (1957).
2. 9 N.Y.2d 286, 213 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1961).
3. Supra note I at 668-669.
4. Ibid.
5. United States v. Benson, 20 F.R.D. 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
6. Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414, 420 (1953).
7. 103 Cong. Rec. 7401-02 (Daily Ed. June 4, 1957).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1957).

9. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (B), (C), (D) (1957).
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action. 2. The statute only allows for the production of written statements
made by the witness and signed or otherwise adopted by him or a substantially
verbatim recital of a contemporaneously recorded oral statement; 10 whereas,
the case covered all reports in the government's possession covering events testified to at the trial.
The Jencks case as modified by the statute is the present rule in all the
federal courts. Although some writers feel that the Supreme Court's statement
"justice requires no less" was an expression of the minimal constitutional requirement, 10a the opinion was not specifically based on constitutional grounds;
therefore, the states have not been obliged to adopt the rule. Even though not
required, some states have felt it desirable to follow the federal approach and
New York has recently seen fit to do so in People v. Rosario."
Prior to the Court of Appeals' holding in the Rosario case, New York had
required a preliminary showing of inconsistency before defense counsel could
obtain the witness' statement.' 2 The approach was identical to pre-Jencks practice in the federal courts. Upon the urging of defense counsel, the Court of
Appeals in the Rosario case changed this rule and adopted one similar to the
Jencks holding. Speaking for the majority Judge Fuld said:
A right sense of justice entitles the defense to examine a witness' prior
statement, whether or not it varies from his testimony on the stand.
As long as the statement relates to the subject matter of the witness'
testimony and contains nothing that must be kept confidential, defense
counsel should be allowed to determine for themselves the use to be
made of it on cross-examination."
The Court then asks that we compare U.S. Code, title 18, Section 3500. This
is an indication but not a clear expression of intent to adopt the Jencks
legislation.
The Rosario rule differs from the Jencks legislation in two important respects: 1. If the statement is determined to be privileged, defense counsel may
not obtain it. In the federal courts a claim of privilege results in either striking
the witness' testimony or declaring a mistrial. 2. A statement is clearly defined
by the federal legislation; whereas, the New York interpretation is much
broader in that it would allow memoranda of the witness' statement.
Since New York has adopted the philosophy and basic rule of the federal
courts, later decisions may fill the gap between Rosario and the federal legislation. It is the opinion of this writer that since the government is given the
advantage of invoking its privilege, the defendant in a criminal case should
not bear the cost of this protection. If it can be shown that there is a subject10.
lOa.
11.
12.
140, 186
13.

Supra note 8.
See 34 Ind. L.J. 441 (1959).
Supra note 2.
People v. Bal, 7 N.Y.2d 152, 196 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1959); People v. Walsh, 262 N.Y.
N.E. 422 (1933).
Supra note 2 at 289, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 450.
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matter relationship between the privileged statement and the witness' testimony,
both should be excluded from the trial. However, at this time it is not possible
to predict the Court's action on this matter.
The change in the New York rule is not a drastic departure when considered in the light of the advances made by other states, notably California."
However, it is significant as part of a growing trend which has been long in
coming. A typical opinion was expressed by Judge Cardoza as recently as 1927,
when he stated that he could see only the faint beginnings of a doctrine which
would allow.discovery in a criminal case. 15 The lag in this area can be attributed to the abhorrence of criminal discovery at common law. 16
The objections to criminal discovery at common law are much the same
as today, and may be stated as follows: 1. Discovery would wholly subvert
criminal law administration. This objection is based more on fear than analysis,
but it does reflect the feeling of some that the scales of justice are already
far too overbalanced in favor of the accused. 17 2. Discovery would greatly
increase the opportunity for, and the incidence of, perjury. Concomitant with
this would be tampering with evidence. Taken together, this would lead to
the fabrication of a false defense.' 8 3. A true system of disclosure presupposes
mutuality.' 9 Our rule against compulsory self-incrimination makes mutuality
20
impossible.
The Supreme Court in the Jencks case, referring to discovery at the trial
said, "justice requires no less." 21 In the light of the Supreme Court's attitude,
many states have taken pause to review the traditional objections to criminal
22
discovery.
The first objection is really only a conclusion drawn from other reasons
and belies analysis. Some of the arguments which give rise to the inference
will be discussed under objection three.
The second objection is more appropriate to pretrial discovery than the
situation presented in Jencks or Rosario, but considering discovery as a whole
14. E.g., Walker v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. App. 2d 134, 317 P.2d 130 (3d Dist.
1957), granted inspection of autopsy report; State v. Haas, 188 Md. 63, 51 A.2d 647
(1947); State v. Johnson, 28 N.J. 133, 145 A.2d 313 (1958), discretionary inspection;
DiJoseph Petition, 394 Pa. 19, 145 A.2d 187 (1958), granted inspection of a gun found by
the police; Commonwealth v. Stepper, 54 Lac. Jur. 205 (Pa. 1952), murder case, ordered
inspection of a confession prior to trial. Contra, Watts v. State, 222 Ark. 427, 261 S.W.2d
402 (1953) ; State v. Leland, 190 Ore. 598, 227 P.2d 785 (1951), aff'd, 343 U.S. 790 (1952) ;
State v. Lack, 118 Utah 128, 221 P.2d 852 (1950). For an excellent discussion, see Fletcher,
"Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases," 12 Stan. L. Rev. 293 (1960).
15. People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84 (1927).
16. See 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1859g (3d ed. 1940); 2 Wharton, Criminal Evidence
§ 671 (12th ed. 1955).
17. See United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646, 649 (S.D. N.Y. 1923).
18. See State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 210, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (1953).
19. See State v. Rhoads, 81 Ohio St. 397, 424, 91 N.E. 186, 192 (1910).
20. See Goldstein, "The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal
Procedure," 69 Yale L.J. 1149, 1197 (1960).
21. Supra note 1 at 669.
22. See Fletcher, supra note 14.
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is not without some merit. If the defendant has access to the prosecution's
files, he will have a greater incentive to concoct a false defense, and certainly
will be able to make the defense itself more credible. Although discovery may
facilitate perjury, it must be remembered that we have overlooked this possible
abuse in our civil procedure. While it is true that there is more likelihood of
perjury in a criminal case due to the penalties involved, it must not be forgotten that we consider all men innocent until proven guilty. To assume a
greater incidence of perjury in the criminal case, is to brand all defendants as
criminal before they are so adjudged. The theory of civil procedure, that full
disclosure will best lead to an accurate ascertainment of the truth, can also
be applied to criminal cases.
The pith of the third argument against discovery is that full disclosure is
not possible in a criminal case. On the surface this would seem to be a valid
objection destroying the analogy to civil procedure. To this writer, however,
it appears that the state already has the advantage in pretrial discovery. The
constitutional protection against self-incrimination does not bar the state from
interrogating the accused either before or after arraignment. Quite often the
accused is an indigent, and much of this interrogation is done when the accused
is without the benefit of counsel. Witnesses are also more accessible to the
state. In some cases the state has taken the criminal law counterpart of a
deposition, the confession of the accused. The vast resources of the state in
gathering and scientifically analyzing evidence cannot in any way be compared
to the limited facilities of the accused. If the accused voluntarily takes the
witness stand, he is subject to the rule of the Rosario and Jencks cases, in the
same manner as the state's witness. To say that extension of the discovery
rules in a criminal case will give undue advantage to the accused because of the
lack of mutuality seems at best an ostrich-type approach to the law.
The privilege against self-incrimination is not an insurmountable obstacle.
The privilege may be voluntarily waived by the defendant.2 3 Many times the
defendant would choose this alternative if he knew that it would lead to free
and open discovery of the prosecution. We should leave a way open for the
defendant to do this, since this would obviate what appears to be the major
objection to criminal discovery, the lack of mutuality. An argument might be
made against this in that it leaves the choice entirely at the discretion of the
accused; however, the purpose of a criminal trial is not to convict, but to see
that justice is done. As was said in Reynolds v. United States, "The rationale of
the criminal case is that since the Government, which prosecutes the accused
also has the duty to see that justice is done, it is unconscionable to allow it to
undertake prosecution and then invoke its governmental privileges to deprive
the accused of anything which might be material to his defense." 24 At the
very least, discovery should be allowed when the accused has offered reciprocity.
23.
24.

McCain v. Superior Court, 184 A.CA. 853, 7 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1960).
345 U.S. 12 (1952).
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Justice can be best served by allowing discovery in criminal cases. It is
unfortunate that the Supreme Court did not decide the Jencks case on purely
constitutional grounds. The states, however, are gradually adopting the policy
considerations of the Court and we may look forward to an enlightened policy
of criminal discovery in future years. For the present though, we will have to
content ourselves with limited advancements in "at trial" discovery. Pretrial
discovery is subject to the most serious objections and will be strongly resisted.
Perhaps eventually, the legislature will take the initiative away from the courts
and declare a policy consonant with justice and modern procedural reform.
Until then, we must praise the leaders and hope for followers.
F. P.M.
ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSION ELICITED AFTER INDICTMENT

In People v. Waterman,25 the defendant was convicted of robbery in the
first degree, second degree grand larceny and assault. A complete confession
made by Waterman after indictment and in the absence of counsel was admitted into evidence at the trial. The confession was obtained through interrogation by a police officer who knew that defendant had been indicted. At
this interrogation after indictment the defendant did not request counsel, nor
was the defendant told that counsel could be present. The Appellate Division,
in a three to two decision, relying on the recent Court of Appeals decision of
People v. DiBiasi,2 6 reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial. 27 The
court stated that the confession was inadmissible as evidence because it was
obtained after indictment in the absence of counsel in violation of defendant's
constitutional rights to counsel and against self-incrimination. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision on similar grounds.
The dissenting opinion written in the Appellate Division was adopted by
two of the dissenters in the Court of Appeals. The dissent refused to recognize
People v. DiBiasi as indicative of a broad exclusionary rule of evidence and
would have limited DiBiasi to the peculiar facts therein. The dissent pointed
out that Waterman, unlike DiBiasi, had not surrendered to authorities by
arrangement of counsel but had been apprehended by the police. This factual
differentiation forrhulated by the dissent is without merit. A reasonable conclusion, albeit disagreeable, from the dissent's argument would be: that if law
enforcement authorities are put on notice that defendant has an attorney, his
right to counsel during police interrogation after indictment is safeguarded;
however, if defendant has the misfortune of being apprehended by authorities
without an attorney representing him, then his right to counsel for postindictment interrogation ceases.
Implicit within the DiBiasi and Waterman cases is a contest between
individual liberties and the effective solution of crimes against society. The
25.

9 N.Y.2d 561, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1961).

26.

7 N.Y.2d 544, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1960).

27.

12 A.D.2d 84, 208 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1st Dep't 1960).

